International Credit and Welfare: Some Paradoxical Results with Implications for the Organization of International Lending by Basu, Kaushik & Morita, Hodaka
March 18, 2001
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT AND WELFARE
Some Paradoxical Results with Implications for the












This paper models a developing nation that faces a foreign exchange shortage and
hence its demand for foreign goods is limited both by its income and its foreign exchange
balance.  Availability of international credit relaxes the second constraint.  It is shown
that in this setting the availability of international credit at concessionary rates can leave
the borrowing nation worse off than if it had to borrow money at higher market rates.
This ‘paradox of benevolence’ is then used to motivate a discussion of policies pertaining
to international lending and the Southern government’s method of rationing out foreign
exchange to the importers.
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1.  Introduction
There is a small literature that argues that the benefits of international credit do
not accrue to the recipient developing country, ending up, instead, benefiting the donors
or in the coffers of large corporations that sell goods to the developing country.
1  The aim
of this paper is to subject this claim to careful theoretical scrutiny.  What we find is that,
while there is no reason to believe that this hypothesis is always or even generally true,
there do exist parametric configurations under which it is valid.  This is interesting
enough because of its paradoxical nature.  At first sight it seems that the availability of
credit (or, more generally, availability of credit at better terms) cannot make the recipient
nation worse off because the recipient has the option not to take the credit or to pay a
higher interest than what the donors demand (by, for instance, burning money).
However, such simple logic runs into difficulty in the domain of strategic international
finance.
We construct a formal model and show that when a nation buys goods from large
corporations with monopolistic power, the availability of cheaper international credit may
actually leave the recipient worse off.  In particular, a poor developing country that is
currently borrowing money from a profit-maximizing international bank or financial
institution  may become worse off if some ‘benevolent’ organization steps in, in place of
the profit-maximizing bank, and begins to lend hard currency at a zero or subsidized
interest rate.
                                                
1 For works that either defend this proposition or debate it, see Winkler (1929), Hyson and Strout (1968),
Bhagwati (1970), Gwyne (1983), Taylor (1985), Darity and Horn (1988), Basu (1991), and Deshpande
(1999).2
The reason, roughly speaking, is that the lowered interest rate for borrowing
foreign exchange changes the strategic environment in which the developing country
buys goods from large corporations in such a manner that the benefits of the lower
interest rate, and more, flow out of the country.
Our model has important implications for the organization of international lending
by multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and, more pertinently, the IMF,
that give subsidized credit.  The model in this paper alerts such lending agencies that
there are situations where the benefits of cheap money may flow out entirely (and then
some more) from the recipient nation.  In such environments a lowered interest is no
longer the best way to give relief to nations facing foreign exchange shortages.  Hence,
this paper, by making international lending organizations aware of this risk of an adverse
effect of international credit, urges them to be extra careful in designing their
international lending programs.
The model also highlights the crucial role of the mechanism through which the
limited foreign exchange is released to the importers in the borrower country by the
borrower government (or the Central Bank). The allocation rules followed by the
government can make a crucial difference in determining what effect international credit
or aid has on the well-being of the recipient nation. Hence the model, despite its use of a
rather stylized framework, depicts theoretically the general idea explored empirically by
Burnside and Dollar (2000) on how the nature of governance in the borrowing nation can
critically determine whether aid (or subsidized international lending) will work to its
advantage or not.
2
                                                
2 See also Collier (1997) and Hansen and Tarp (2001).3
In constructing our model we try to steer a path between using strong assumptions
in order to keep the algebra tractable and building in enough features of reality so as to
make our model relevant to at least some particular realities.
Before proceeding to build the model we should warn that the purpose of a
theoretical model is to show that certain phenomena are possible.  In this paper we show
this for the ‘paradox of benevolence’.  To determine how plausible this theoretically
possible phenomenon is in reality, we need empirical work.  In that sense what this paper
tries to establish is the need for empirical work in a certain direction.
2.  The Model
In this model there is a developing country – henceforth South, and an
industrialized country – henceforth North.  These countries have their own currencies but
for all inter-country trade and exchange the only acceptable currency is the North’s
currency.  This is the ‘hard’ currency.  We shall refer to the South’s currency as the ‘soft’
currency.  The South, in our model, has a shortage of ‘hard currency’.  This is so in the
sense that if it could buy more hard currency at the going exchange rate it would do so
and use it to buy more foreign goods.  The fact of a country facing a shortage of hard
currency suggests some rigidity in the exchange rate.  For reasons of simplicity we treat
the exchange rate as fixed and, without loss of generality, we treat it as fixed at 1.  That
is, one unit of the hard currency changes for one unit of the soft currency.  This is not as
strong an assumption as appears at first sight.  The fact that many Third World nations do
face a shortage of hard currency, suggests that exchange rates are at least partially rigid in4
reality. We suspect that there are innate factors in the structure of international economic
relations which cause this. How else can one explain why, even after developing country
governments go for a free float and allow the exchange rate to be market driven,
shortages of hard currency persist.
The stronger assumption in this paper concerns the modeling of the developing
country government.  We treat the government not as a strategic agent, nimbly
maximizing some payoff, but as a somewhat mechanical bureaucracy which has some
rigid rules, to which it adheres.  In particular, we model m (‡2) licensed importers in the
South, to which the government (or the Central Bank) allocates its limited foreign
exchange balance; and they are given the right to buy goods abroad and sell them in the
South.  One reason why we treat the government as not a strategic agent is for simplicity;
the model has a surfeit of strategic agents.  However, we also believe that this description
is fairly realistic in the case of many developing and transition economies.
We shall in this paper focus on one good, which the South likes to consume but it
does not produce.  The good is in fact produced by a firm based in the North, which sells
the good (may be in the North but also) in the South through the licensed importers.  The
Northern firm produces the good at a constant marginal cost c, faces no fixed cost, and
chooses the price p at which it sells to the South.  Though in our formal model we work
with one such firm, our qualitative results would be unchanged under n oligopolistic
firms.
On the demand side we assume, without loss of generality, that the South has one
consumer, who is a price taker.  If the consumer has free access to the hard currency at5
the going exchange rate, which is 1, then the consumer’s inverse demand function for the
good sold by the North is given by:
p = a – bx,        (1)
where a > c, b > 0, p is the price of the product and x the amount demanded.  This will be
called the unconstrained demand curve.  Without a shortage in hard currency and in the
absence of licensed importers (that is, assuming that the consumers buy directly from the













This point is illustrated in Figure 1 by the point 
* E .
We assume that the Southern government has only R (> 0) units of foreign
exchange reserves; and this is ‘insufficient’ for what the South wants to import.  In other
words, we assume that the following condition holds:








This assumption says that point E* in Figure 1 is not feasible due to the shortage of hard
currency in the South.  In other words, the shortage of hard currency is such that the
Northern firm cannot fully capture the monopoly rent associated with the unconstrained
demand curve.
It is being assumed here that, what the South suffers from is not a problem of
insolvency but illiquidity.  In other words, it expects to have adequate access to foreign
exchange in the future.  The simplest way to make this formal is to suppose that the
South’s currency becomes convertible in the future.  So in the future its demand is not6
constrained by its foreign exchange reserves.  We will assume that this foreign-exchange
constrained position lasts for one period (which can of course be very long) and it is this
one period that our model studies.
So the Southern government has a reserve of R units of hard currency.  How does
the government use this?  We will assume that the government sets a quota for each of
the m ( ‡ 2)  importers.  That is, each importer is given the right to acquire foreign
exchange up to this quota limit by giving up an equivalent amount of soft currency.  With
this foreign exchange the importers use the hard currency to buy goods from the North
which they then sell to the Southern consumers.  While a slew of different methods for
rationing out limited foreign exchange have been used by different developing countries
and transition economies, the structure that we are using is not unrealistic, and, in the
case of, for instance, Pakistan and India, especially through the seventies and eighties, fits
reality quite well.
3  We shall, for simplicity, assume that all importers are treated
identically, and so each importer has access to R/m units of the hard currency.  It will be
assumed that the importers take the international price of the product as given and
constitute a Bertrand oligopoly in the domestic market.
It will be shown later (in Section 4) that, for the purpose of our analysis, such a
model works the same way as a model in which the Southern government gives
consumers direct access to a fixed amount of foreign exchange.  Though this is
unrealistic, its mathematical equivalence to the above more realistic specification (to be
demonstrated formally later in Section 4) implies that we can develop our model by
                                                
3 Writing in the very early nineties on Pakistan, Baysan (1992, p. 468) observed, “Distinct from import
bans and restrictions, value limits on individual licenses against cash for imports of machinery and7
assuming that the Southern government gives its citizens direct access to a certain
amount of foreign exchange in order to buy foreign goods.  That is the route that we take
here.
Given this, we suppose that the Southern government announces that the
consumer can acquire up to R units of hard currency.  In other words, the amount of
foreign good, x, that the consumer buys must satisfy
x £ R/p        (2)
Keeping in mind that (1) implies that the demand function (with no foreign exchange
constraint) is given by x = (a-p)/b, and combining this with (2) we see that the actual
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This is demonstrated by the thick line in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 somewhere here]
We now incorporate international lending into our model; we will consider the
following two cases:
Case I: There is a non-profit ‘international organization’ that lends hard currency credit
             to the South at a subsidized interest rate.
Case II: There is a profit-maximizing international bank (based in the North) that gives
credit to the South.
                                                                                                                                                
millwork have been (and still are being) maintained … .  These ceilings … function as nontariff barriers …8
We shall, throughout, assume, without loss of generality, that the interest rate
prevailing in the North is zero.  The Southern consumer and government do not have
direct access to the Northern credit market, but the international organization and the
Northern bank have access to it.  So to these latter agents the opportunity (interest) cost
of lending money to the South is zero.  It will also be assumed throughout that the
borrowing country never defaults.  Though default (or the threat of default) is important
in reality and there is a substantial literature that investigates this (for surveys see Sachs,
1984; Kletzer, 1988; and Eaton and Fernandez, 1995), to introduce default would be a
distraction, given present focus.
The analysis of Case I is straightforward.  Let us suppose that the international
organization lends to the South at the opportunity cost interest, that is, an interest rate of
zero.  Once South has access to such credit, the foreign exchange constraint of R
becomes immaterial.  South’s demand for the product is given by equation (1) and the
equilibrium price and quantity are given by p* and x*, which are represented by point E*
in Figure 1.
Case II is the interesting case, and what we go on to show, later, is that the
Southern country may be better off in this case than under Case I.  But first we need to
depict the equilibrium that will arise in Case II.
Since the central issue in the analysis of Case II is the strategic interaction
between the firm and the bank, we derive the reaction functions (more precisely ‘implicit
reaction functions’) of the firm and the bank and then characterize Nash equilibria.  Let
                                                                                                                                                
and serve as a nonprice rationing mechanism for the allocation of foreign exchange.”9
us start with the firm.  Consider first the case where R = 0, that is, for whatever the South
buys from the North it has to first borrow money from the bank.
[Figure 2 somewhere here]
In Figure 2, aF is the South’s unconstrained demand curve (given by equation
(1)).  Suppose the bank charges an interest rate of i.  Then if the firm charges a price of p,
the effective price to the Southern consumer is (1 + i)p.  Hence the effective demand
curve is given by the line a'F where Oa = (1 + i)Oa'.  Standard monopoly analysis implies
that the firm’s best response is to choose a price that is represented by the midpoint of
line segment a'H', shown by point E'.  By considering different interest rates, i, and
plotting the mid-point that represents the firm’s best response for each i, we obtain the
firm’s best response curve. This is represented by the broken line E*E'C.  We call it the
firm’s ‘implicit reaction function.’
4  The reader should also check that, if c were 0, the
firm’s implicit reaction function would be a vertical line from E* down to the horizontal
axis. The reason why we call this an ‘implicit’ reaction function is because, unlike in a
conventional reaction function where the two variables chosen by the two players are
represented on the two axis, here the interest rate i, chosen by the bank, is not represented
on any axis, but is implicit in the effective demand curve.
[Figure 3 somewhere here]
Now let us bring in the fact that R > 0, as shown in Figure 3.  If the interest rate, i,
charged by the bank is such that the effective demand curve is a'F, then the actual
demand curve (the one which takes into account the fact that up to R units, the South
does not need to borrow money) is given by the thick line, going through points B and D.10
The firm’s implicit reaction function is E*K’ and point B, where E*K is a truncated
segment of the E*E'C curve in Figure 2.  To see this, gradually increase the value of i,
starting from i = 0.  The firm’s best response is represented by point E* when i=0, and by
point E’ (see Figure 2) when i is positive but sufficiently small.  Then, as i rises E’ moves
in the southwest direction. But before E’ reaches point K (in Figure 3), the firm’s best
response point will jump to point B. Let us denote by K’ the point where the jump occurs.
To see that this will happen, suppose that i is such that the line, a’F, passes through point
K in Figure 3.  Clearly, the firm is strictly better off by choosing the price that
corresponds to point B rather than point K; since at both prices revenue is the same and
the total cost is smaller at point B.  Hence, there exists point K’, where the firm is
indifferent between choosing point K’ and point B.
Now we turn to the bank’s reaction function.  First suppose that the firm has fixed





‡  holds.  In this case, the South does not borrow hard
currency because the consumer’s demand given by the unconstrained demand curve (i.e.,
p = a-bx)  is feasible without borrowing any hard currency.  Then, any value of i is the
bank’s best response, because the bank cannot make any profits from lending to the
South for all i‡0.





<  holds.  This
condition means that, under the price, the consumer’s demand given by the unconstrained
demand curve is not feasible without borrowing hard currency because the Southern
                                                                                                                                                
4 The mathematical properties of the implicit reaction function are spelled out in Anant, Basu and Mukherji
(1995).11
government has only R (> 0) units of hard currency.  Graphically, the price is strictly
between the prices represented by point B and D in Figure 3.  Given such price, the bank
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[Figure 4 somewhere here]
Graphically, the bank’s profit is represented by area QRST in Figure 4, where the firm
has fixed a price at p=p’ and the bank has chosen i represented by a’F.  Given p’, the
bank chooses i so that the area QRST is maximized.  The maximization implies that the
bank chooses i such that point R in Figure 4 becomes the midpoint of QZ.  Then, for any
given p’, the bank’s best response is to choose i such that corresponding a’F line goes
through the midpoint of QZ.  Plotting such midpoints for different values of p’, we obtain
the broken line in Figure 5.  We call it the bank’s ‘implicit reaction function.’
[Figure 5 somewhere here]
We are now ready to identify Nash equilibria.  Superimpose the firm’s implicit
reaction function (E*K’ in Figure 3) here.  A Nash equilibrium is then depicted by the
point of intersection of the two reaction functions, shown here by point N, where the
equilibrium price is given by  p ˆ  and the interest rate is the one implicit in the effective
demand curve  F a ˆ . This is an equilibrium in which a positive amount is borrowed.  We
call this the N-equilibrium.  Note that the N-equilibrium does not always exist because12
the broken line does not necessarily intersect with E*K’.  Note also that there exists
another Nash equilibrium, where the firm chooses the price that corresponds to point B
and the bank chooses a very high interest rate. This is an equilibrium in which no lending
occurs.
3.  The Paradox of Benevolence
We now demonstrate that the paradox of benevolence can happen in the N-
equilibrium.  The aggregate welfare earned by the South in the N-equilibrium is shown in
Figure 6 as the area STQ . a p
￿
[Figure 6 somewhere here]
Let us call this, in brief, 
p W , where the p is a reminder that this is the welfare of the
South when the lender of credit is a profit-maximizer.  Let us denote South’s aggregate
welfare when the Northern lender is benevolent (and charges no interest) by 
b W , where
b is for benevolence.  Our claim is that there are parameters of the model where
. W W
b p <
We will say that the ‘paradox of benevolence’ occurs if this inequality is true.
To prove this we need to first depict W
b.  Recall that when the South can freely
borrow from a benevolent lender (Case I, above) equilibrium occurs at point 
* E  and the
price of the Northern good is given by  . p
*   Hence W
b is the area of  . p aE
* *   By13
examining Figure 6 it is clear that a priori we cannot say which is larger W
b or 
p W .
Now, we are able to state the central result of the paper.
Proposition (The Paradox of Benevolence): For any parameter values that satisfy
Assumption 1, there exists a value c ~ (>0) such that, holding all parameter values except c
fixed, the model exhibits the following property for all c ˛ [0, c ~ ]:
The N-equilibrium exists and the paradox of benevolence occurs in that equilibrium.
[Proof] See Appendix.
To understand the result graphically, consider the case where the marginal cost of
producing the good, c, is zero.  As we have already seen, when this happens, the firm’s
implicit reaction function is a vertical line from 
* E .  Hence, the N-equilibrium point, N,
is vertically below 
* E  (see Figure 5).  In that case the area depicting W
b sits properly
inside the area depicting 
p W , which implies that we have W
b < W
p when c=0.
Continuity of the demand function implies that W
b < W
p holds for all small enough c
(>0).
Just as the proposition establishes the kinds of value of the cost of production that
is likely to give rise to the paradox of benevolence, it is interesting to inquire into what
levels of foreign exchange reserves are likely to give rise to the paradox. It is easy to
verify that the paradox cannot arise if R were equal to zero or it is very large (for
instance, it is so large that the point E* is achievable with the existing foreign exchange
balance). This suggests that the paradox may be more likely to arise for countries with14
‘intermediate’ foreign exchange reserves. We conducted numerical simulations to
compute the zones of paradox in the (R, c)-space, in particular, a space in which the
horizontal axis represents R and the vertical axis represents c. For each value of R we
have computed the maximum value of c, denoted c
max, such that the paradox occurs for
all non-negative values of c less than c
max. The computation is made for the case where a
= 10 and b = 0.4 or 0.5 and the results are displayed in Table 1.
The table tells that, for instance, with b = 0.4, we have c
max = 2.23, 6.06, or 3.00,
when R = 10, 20, or 40, respectively.  Namely, the Paradox of Benevolence occurs for all
c ˛ [0, 6.06] when a = 10, b = 0.4 and R = 20.  Note that c < a (= 10 in these examples)
must hold for the Northern firm to sell a positive amount of goods to the South.  The
numerical examples therefore seem to indicate that the Paradox of Benevolence occurs in
non-trivial ranges of parameter values.
Table 1.  Numerical examples for the Paradox of Benevolence
   (The value of  c
max  when a = 10).
b = 0.4 b = 0.5
R =   5 0.94 1.22
R = 10 2.23 3.22
R = 15 7.00 6.29
R = 20 6.06 5.16
R = 25 5.16 4.16
R = 30 4.35 3.31
R = 35 3.63 2.57
R = 40 3.00 1.91
R = 45 2.44 1.23
R = 50 1.91 -
R = 55 1.37 -
R = 60 0.73 -
R = 65 - -15
It is interesting to note the table exhibits an “inverted-U” shape in the (R, c)-
space.  That is, holding other parameter values fixed, the value of c
max is increasing in R
when the value of R is relatively small, and it is decreasing in R when the value of R is
relatively large. Although we have worked out a number of examples and identified this
property in all of them, we have been unable to prove that this is the general property.
4.  Competition Among Licensed Importers
In Section 2 we began with the realistic assumption that, in the South, the
government gives some designated importers the right to acquire hard currency from the
central bank in order to import goods for domestic sale.  We then pointed out that, if
these importers took the international price, p, of the good and the interest rate, i, as
given, and chose the domestic sale price (that is, they played a Bertrand game), we could
ignore these importers for the purpose of our analysis.  Given this, we derived our result
under the assumption that government allocated foreign exchange directly to the
consumers rather than to the designated importers.  In this section we show that we can
indeed ignore the importers in order to derive out results.







where r is the price that the consumers have to pay.  There are now m identical importers.
They can buy the good (subject to having the requisite foreign exchange) from a Northern
producer at a price, p, chosen by the Northern producer.  It is assumed that the Southern
importers take this price as given.  Each of these importers is given access to R/m units of16
foreign exchange by the Southern government.  If they want more foreign exchange they
have to borrow this from a Northern bank at an interest rate of i.  Hence, if an importer
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Now, each of these m importers have to choose a price at which it offers to sell
the product to the Southern consumers.  If  i r  denotes the price offered by importer i, then
we may denote the strategy n-tuple of the m importers by
(r1, …., rm)
The profit earned by importer i may then be denoted by pi(r1, …, rm).
Our aim is to characterize the Nash equilibrium (Bertrand equilibrium in this
case) of this game.  We will in particular be interested in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium.  In other words, we define r




*, …, ri, …, r
*), for all ri.
Fortunately, to characterize such an equilibrium we do not need to fully
characterize the pi function.  We will here make the following reasonable assumptions.  If
every importer charges the same price r, then each importer faces a demand of (a-r)/bm.
If all importers, excepting importer i, charges r and importer i charges ri („ r), then the
consumers respond as follows.  If ri  < r, importer i faces a demand equal to (a-ri)/b.  All
consumers who fail to buy from i, direct their demand at price r to the other importers.  If
ri > r, all consumers go to the importers other than i.  Only those with unmet demand turn17
to i.  These are fairly normal assumptions and one can find a formal statement of these in
Basu (1993).
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<  holds.
This condition means that, if government allocated foreign exchange directly to the
consumers, then the consumers’ demand given by the unconstrained demand curve is not
feasible without borrowing hard currency and so they borrow a positive amount of hard
currency from the bank.  Under such p and i, the horizontal summation of all importers’
marginal cost functions (derived from (4)) is the thick line shown in Figure 7.  It is easy
to show that in this case r
* = (1 + i)p is an equilibrium.  That is, if each importer charges
r
* then no one can do better by deviating.  To see this note that when everybody charges
(1+i)p, the profit earned by each importer is given by iR/mp.  Clearly by undercutting this
price, an importer can only do worse.  If, on the other hand, an importer charges ri >
(1+i)p, no one will buy from him.  Hence, his profit will drop to zero.
The analysis in the previous paragraph indicates that, for any p and i that satisfy
the conditions described above, the profits of the firm and the bank are identical with or
without the designated importers.  Also, consumers face the same marginal price and
demand the same amount of the good in the two cases.  A similar equivalence can be
shown for other combinations of p and i.  Since we focus on the welfare consequences of
the strategic interaction between the firm and the bank, this equivalence allows us to
ignore the importers in our analysis.18
[Figure 7 somewhere here]
5.  Policy Implications
The model and the results described in this paper have important policy
implications.  First, it cautions aid donor agencies not to presume that subsidized credit,
given to a Third World nation, necessarily benefits the recipient.  Depending on the
structure of the import market, the advantages of subsidized credit may flow into the
hands of corporations that sell goods to the recipient nations.  In such a situation the
donor agency has to think of ways, other than subsidized credit, for reaching benefit to
nations.  The classical literature on aid-tying used to be concerned with this question.
What we have shown in this paper, however, is that the flow-back of benefit to the North
can occur even when aid is not tied, but depending on the market structure of imports and
the strategic position of the donor.
In trying to reach out to poor nations, most international organizations use the
method of lowering interest rates.  The IMF uses this method for the most highly
indebted and poor nations, while at the same time combining the generous loan terms
with ‘conditionalities’, which pertain to macroeconomic policies such as the need to keep
the fiscal deficit under control and money supply growth in check.  What our paper alerts
us to is the fact that such policies may not be enough to plug the holes through which the
benefits of cheap credit get frittered away.  The ‘market structure’ of trade may be the
main route through which the immiserization occurs, by causing all the benefits to flow19
out to the international firms that export goods to the South.  Hence, before lending at
concessional rates, it is worth examining and advising recipient governments on the
channels and structure of trade and methods of releasing limited foreign exchange
reserves.  And this brings us to the subject of policy from the Southern point of view.
The model suggests (though we have not really gone into this) that there may be
advantages to the South of giving the import rights to a single agent.  This would
empower the importers vis-à-vis the Northern manufacturer and may end up benefiting
the Southern consumer.  Secondly, the Southern government may stand to gain by being
more pro-active in the foreign exchange market.  Releasing the foreign exchange as
quotas to different agents may not be a good idea.
Let us take up the first point first.  In our model the Southern importers do poorly
because they compete against one another both in the product market and the
international credit market.  If they could behave collusively, they could exercise market
power.  However, collusive behavior is difficult to sustain on its own – a point made
persuasively in the context of international borrowing by governments by Fernandez and
Glazer (1990).  However, in our model since the borrowers are agencies within a nation,
the government can enable them to exercise market power.  The system of ‘canalized’
imports used by some nations, for instance, India, could have potentially played this role.
In practice, canalized imports have been inefficient and bureaucratically cumbersome.  Its
potential has not been understood, let alone realized.
Let us now turn to the second subject of how to ration the limited foreign
exchange reserve.  The method analyzed in this paper – namely, one where the foreign
exchange is rationed out to the importers – is not the only one.  The government could20
(and they often do) place quantity restrictions on the amount each importer may import.
The analysis of this is not trivial since, while each importer will of course take the
quantity ration as given, the government should be modeled as choosing that quantity
ration, given which the total import value equals the amount of foreign exchange the
government has (or wants to release).  There can be other more sophisticated kinds of
rationing, for instance one in which the amount of foreign exchange released to an
importer could depend on the terms of trade.  Each such ration will change the market
outcome and the total benefit generated to the South and may even avert the paradox of
benevolence.  In the future it will be worth examining formally the welfare effects of
different systems of releasing limited foreign exchange and for the Southern government
to choose a system consciously to maximize the welfare of its consumers.21
Appendix
Proof of the Proposition:
We first analyze the firm’s best response given i (‡0) chosen by the bank.









Under (A1), the South does not borrow any hard currency for any p chosen by the
Northern firm.  To see this, note that (A1) is equivalent to ‘
b
p i a p
R
] ) 1 ( [ + -
‡  holds for
all p.’ Given such i, the firm chooses p such that the South spends R units of hard
currency to purchase the good; namely it chooses p such that p[(a-p)/b]=R holds.  Hence,



















‡  is a Nash equilibrium.  Graphically, in this
Nash equilibrium the firm chooses the price that corresponds to point B in Figure 3 and
the bank chooses high enough i so that a’F does not intersect the rectangular hyperbola
twice.  In this equilibrium (we call it B-equilibrium), the bank’s profit is zero and the
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Consider the monopolist who faces the demand curve given by p=(a-bx)/(1+i).  It charges




















Note that the Northern firm can earn p
B by choosing p=p
B regardless the value of i
chosen by the bank.  Then, given i, the firm chooses  p ~ if and only if p ~” ( p ~-c)x ~‡p
B.






























Next we analyze the bank’s best response given that the firm chooses p that
satisfies (A8).
(A8) p[(a-p)/b]>R
Given such price, the demand given by the unconstrained demand schedule (which is
p=a-bx) is not feasible unless the bank sets i=0.  The bank chooses i that maximizes its


















Note that, given (A8), the bank can choose i>0 such that P(i)>0.  The standard











Now we characterize a Nash equilibrium in which the bank lends a strictly




Note that f(0)=bcR‡0 and f(c)=c
2(c-a)-bcR£0.  This means that (A11) has exactly one
root that is strictly greater than c.  We denote the root by p*.  If there exists a Nash
equilibrium in which the bank lends a strictly positive amount of hard currency to the
South, such equilibrium is characterized by (p, i) = (p*, i(p*)).  This constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of the game if and only if (p, i) = (p*, i(p*)) satisfies p ~‡p
B and (A8); or
equivalently if (A12) and (A13) hold.
(A12)
b
bR a a c R
p i b
c p i a
2
) 4 (
*)) ( 1 ( 4
] *)) ( 1 ( [




Note that p* is continuous in c, which implies that i(p*) is also continuous in c.
Let c=0.  Then f(p)=2p








= .  We
find that, when c=0, (A12) is equivalent to a‡ bR 2  and (A13) is equivalent to a> bR 2 .
Note that Assumption 1 implies a> bR 2  holds when c=0, and that both p* and i(p*) are
continuous in c.  This implies that there exists c* (>0) such that both (A12) and (A13)
hold for all c˛[0, c*].
Next, we assume c˛[0, c*], and let W
p denote South’s aggregate welfare in the
Nash equilibrium represented by (p*, i(p*)).  As stated in the text, the social welfare is
represented by the area STQ a p
￿





p p i a
x
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where strict inequality holds because a> bR 2  by Assumption 1.  Note that p*, i(p*) and
x* are all continuous in c.  This implies that there exists c**>0 such that W
p>W
b holds
for all c˛[0, c**].  Finally, let c ~ ”Min [c*, c**], and we obtain the desired result. ￿25
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